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NAFTA CHAPTER 19: HOW WELL DOES IT WORK? HOW
MUCH IS NEEDED?
Richard 0. Cunningham*

Admittedly, the title of my presentation differs somewhat from the title of
this panel as described in the conference brochure. The brochure title states:
"Chapter 19 --- Private Party Appeals from Government Rulings: A Dispute
Settlement Procedure in Operation, How Effective Is It in the Resolution of
Disputes, Are Changes Needed or Possible?" I must confess that after
sending in the outline for my talk, I began to have some sleepless nights over
that difference. Some might say that my situation is reminiscent of the
famous story involving the Humorous Bob Benchley. When Benchley was
studying at Harvard, he designed his class schedule so that none of his
classes began earlier than 11:00 a.m. on Tuesdays and ended no later than
3:00 p.m. on Thursdays. As a consequence of his creative scheduling, he
took a course in U.S.-Canadian relations in which he had very little interest.
He attended no classes and read no books on the subject. On the day of the
final exam for the course, he was confronted with a single question. The
question asked him to discuss in detail the U.S.-Canada fisheries dispute
from the standpoint of either (A) the United States or (B) Canada. He
thought hard for a moment and then began his answer as follows: "The
question, as posed, does not sufficiently probe my knowledge of the subject
and so I will discuss it instead from the standpoint of (C) the fish."
I would like to think that my reason for varying the title of my talk from
that of this panel is better than Benchley's reason for varying his final exam
answer. My reason is that the question posed by the brochure is somewhat
limited in scope. At this stage in Chapter 19's development that question
yields a clear answer; while Chapter 19 is in need of some minor tinkering, it
is on the whole functioning well.
What seems of equal or greater importance to address at this panel
discussion is whether Chapter 19 is still needed at all. Is it still effective as a
discipline on domestic enforcement of import relief laws? How does it
compare with, and in specific cases interrelated with, the discipline now
available under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")? How
does the extension of the process to Mexico - a nation with as-yetSenior International Trade partner at Steptoe & Johnson, LLP in Washington, D.C. I would
like to thank Lee Caplain for his assistance in preparing my comments for publication.
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undeveloped import relief laws and a different (civil law, not common law)
jurisprudence - affect these issues?
In answering these questions, this presentation begins by examining
the genesis of this procedure and its early (and, in a few cases, highly
controversial) history under the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
("FTA"). Next, two major changes in the early 1990s will be analyzed: the
negotiation of the NAFTA, with limited buy significant changes in binational
panel procedures, and the creation in the Uruguay MTN Round of newly
detailed disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing duties, together with
a "true" dispute settlement mechanism. The presentation will then analyze
the special issues and problems arising from the extension of the bilateral
panel review process to Mexico. Finally, conclusions will be drawn as to the
continued vitality of this unique experiment in disciplining import relief
measures on a regional basis.
I. The Genesis and Early History of the Binational Panel Review Process
During the negotiations, which ultimately produced the FTA, Canada was
insistent upon the elimination of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
enforcement. Canada took the position that if the goal of the negotiations
was to create a free trade area, then anti-dumping and countervailing duty
enforcement on transactions occurring within that area should be completely
eliminated. Not suprisingly, U.S. Trade officials responded to Canada's
posture with a complete stonewall. Anti-dumping and countervailing duties
and import relief proceedings, in general, are near and dear to the American
political heart, and Canada's proposal was imply politically infeasible for the
U.S. government.
An ingenious compromise broke the impasse. While the concept of
eliminating anti-dumping enforcement would continue to be discussed
throughout the negotiations, a binational panel process was proposed to act
as a discipline on enforcement of the anti-dumping and countervailing duty
laws in both countries, but especially aimed at the United States.
Why did the U.S. compromise? It is important to understand the context
of the negotiations. At that time (pre-Uruguay Round), the GAT did not
provide an effective discipline on import relief proceedings. The disciplines
set forth in the Anti-dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures were not, sufficiently detailed. There was no
binding dispute settlement mechanism. Moreover, the losing party could
block adoption of an adverse panel report. As a consequence, the general
assessment was that GATT panels would be willing in some cases to deal
with procedural unfairness in domestic enforcement, but would rarely, if
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ever, address significant substantive issues. In politically-charged cases, a
panel report condemning a determination by a domestic authority could (and
probably would) be blocked.
The BinationalPanel Concept in FTA Chapters 1902 and 1904
The binational panel appeal procedure provided in NAFrA Chapter 19 is
reminiscent of the wag's definition of a camel: a horse designed by a
committee. Explicitly created in the FTA as a discipline on enforcement of
domestic anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws, it equally explicitly
does not look to any external or international principles, but instead is limited
exclusively to ensuring that a country's administering authorities "properly"
apply domestic law.1
A brief description of some of the major features of the panel process
provides a sense of its workings. It is important to note that only parties to
the domestic administrative proceeding may bring an appeal to a binational
panel. Governments are not involved in the representation of the parties'
interests. This feature, as described in more detail later in this presentation,
distinguishes the Chapter 19 process from the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, which only allows government representation.
Chapter 19 also outlines the procedure for panel formation. Each panel is
comprised of panelists chosen from a pre-approved roster of candidates,
mostly international trade law practitioners and academics. Each side
chooses two panelists, then the four panelists thus chosen pick the fifth.2
The source of the law to be applied by the panel is, as already mentioned,
domestic.3 The panel applies and interprets the national law of the country
whose administrative determination is being appealed. This includes the
appropriate standard of review. The panel does not base its decision on
GATT law or any other supranational body of law, although such authority
can be persuasive, particularly where the WTO Agreements are selfexecuting as is the case with Mexico.
Panels have the power to either affirm the administrative determination in
question or remand it.4 While there is no explicit power to reverse or to order
a different administrative decision, the panel can continue to remand again
and again. Moreover, it can give instructions that may be the functional
equivalent of a reversal by leading the administering authority to one
I North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 19, Article 1904. U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992,32 I.L.M. 605 (1993).
Id. at annex 1901.2.
3 NAFTA, supra note
1.
2

4

Id.
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particular conclusion. However, a panel determination creates no precedent
in domestic law. At most, a domestic court can look to the intrinsic
persuasiveness of a panel decision.
There is no explicit requirement that a panel's decision be consistent with
that of a prior panel on the same issue. Indeed, in the event of an
intervening domestic court decision, legislative amendment or administrative
rulemaking contrary to a prior panel decision, the later panel is not to follow
the prior panel decision. There is also no appellate review of panel decisions.
However, there is an extraordinary challenge procedure under which a panel
report can be overturned on the basis of a panelist's misconduct, a serious
procedural violation, or a blatant exceeding of the panel's authority. In my
opinion, this provision is the most ill-considered element of the binational
panel system.
At first blush, the logic of replacing a domestic court with a binational
panel that applies domestic law with no presidential effect may seem
dubious. Nevertheless, Canada's negotiators saw the value of such panels in
ameliorating two problems; (i) the perceived excess by U.S. administrators,
especially in the substance of countervailing duty decisions and in
procedures of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to the decisions of U.S. administrative agencies. It was believed that
a binational panel would counter the twin problems because it would possess
a different outlook on the administration of anti-dumping and countervailing
duty laws. Removed one step from national allegiance and bias, the panel
would act impartially to correct aberrations in the application of domestic
law in a manner domestic courts might not be willing to do. This was an
arguable proposition, but and ingenious one that was necessary to save FTA
negotiations.
In the end, Canadian FTA negotiators viewed binational panels as the
best obtainable partial solution, offering the following additional potential
benefits: First panelists, being experienced trade lawyers and academics,
would render decisions on a more educated (and possibly less deferential)
basis. Second, pressure on the panel of non-U.S. Perspectives could make
decisions more objective (again, less deferential). Third, in cases presenting
novel, first impression issues, panels would be freer to reach rational
decisions than would U.S. courts. Fourth, the ability of private parties, rather
than governments, to bring cases to panels would permit issues to be raised
even where the exporting country government might share the importing
county government's view on the issue.
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The Record Under the FTA
By and large, the panel process under the FTA has worked smoothly and
without undue controversy. It has worked well even in very controversial
cases, namely the three appeals of U.S. countervailing duty decisions in the
softwood lumber6 , pork7 and live swine 8 cases. In my opinion, the three
controversial countervail appeals reflect a sporadic tendency of the Unity
States to adopt subsidy interpretations wildly divergent from international
trade norms. In addition, it has become clear that the U.S. administering
authorities feel free to accord no precedential weight whatsoever to panel
determinations inconsistent with their desired policies or interpretations. 9
Despite the generally successful record of the panel process, a few
particular areas of concern are worth noting. The first area involves the
manner in which the Commerce Department has defined the meaning of
"subsidy" in difficult or novel cases. A few examples illustrate this point.
The first involves the Softwood Lumber case. In that case, the industry's
concern was that provinces in Canada, particularly western Canada, were
charging a lower stumpage fee than were U.S. governmental entities,
particularly the U.S. federal government. In short, the same tree cost more in
the United States than in Canada. The U.S. softwood lumber industry
petitioned the Commerce Department to determine that Canadian practices
constituted a subsidy that could be met with countervailing duties. In
addition, the industry lobbied congress hard on the matter and Congress was
more than willing to lend its political support.
Persuaded by political pressure and perhaps the genuine belief that a
subsidy argument existed, the Commerce Department took on the industry's
cause. While Commerce could not explicitly adopt the industry's argument
that Canada's lower-than-U.S. stumpage fees were a subsidy, it reached the
same result in a series of decisions using rationale that twisted the generally
6

In re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01-USA (Appeal of

USA-92-1904-01) (Aug.3, 1994).

In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Prok from Canada, ECC-91-1904-1-USA (Appeal of USA89-1904-11) (June 14, 1991).
8 In re Live Swine from Canada, ECC-93-1904-01-USA (Appeal of USA-91-1904-03) (Apr.
8, 1993).
9 See, e.g., Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel
Products from
Austria (General Issues Appendix) 58 Fed. Reg. 37, 217, 225 (1993), in which the Department
of Commerce failed to follow the holding of the FTA binational panel decision in In re New
Steel Rails from Canada; Algoma Steel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Commission, Nos. USA-891904-09, USA-89-1904-10 (Aug. 13, 1990), on the issue of recurring versus nonrecurring
subsidies.
7
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accepted meaning of "subsidy" as well as the concept of general availability
in an effort to develop a viable theory for imposing countervailing duties on
softwood lumber imports.
Under these circumstances, the Chapter 19 panel process serves a useful
role. The panel, in its unique role, can take the position that the novel issue
should be decided in accordance with traditional anti-dumping and
countervailing duty law concepts. And that is precisely what the panel did.
Another example involves subsidies and privatization. The Commerce
Department has taken the position that a privatization, even with new owners
who paid market value for the entire company, did not in any way change the
continuing countervailability of pre-privatization subsidies.'0
The
irrationality of this position is clear when one considers a simple
hypothetical. Suppose that Company A receives on million dollars from its
government to build a steel mill. Company A operates the steel miss for a
few months and then decides to sell it. Company B purchases the steel mill
for one million dollars. After the sale, which party is subsidized? Most
people would conclude that Company B is not subsidized because it paid one
million dollars for a steel mill that was worth one million dollars. Company
B would seem to have suffered no disadvantage at all. Company A, on the
other hand, may appear to be subsidized because it still has one million
dollars more than it had before it received its government grant.
Suprisingly, the Commerce Department has argued that Company B is in
fact the subsidized company. The rational is based on the premise that
"subsidies travel will assets to their new home."" While this position
initially stood up in U.S. courts 12, after it was overruled by the WTO, the
U.S. courts abandoned it. 3 Nevertheless, the Commerce Department's
approach to subsidies in this case demonstrates once again that in difficult or
novel cases the U.S. government tends to develop views aberrant from the
international trading community's conception of countervailing duty law. 4
10 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, supra note 9, at 259-65.
11Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Hot Rolled

Lead and
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products from the United Kingdom, 58 Fed. Reg. 6237, 6240 (Jan. 27,
1993).
12 See Saarstahl v. U.S., 78 F.3d 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
13 See Delverde v. U.S., 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed Cir.
2000).
14 Indeed a WTO panel in 1999 found that the privatization
of a government-owned company
in an arm's length, fair market value transaction eliminates any "benefit" from preprivatization subsidies and, therefore, no "benefit" from those subsidies can be attributable to
the successor privatized company. Panel Report on United States - Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products
Originating in the United Kingdom, No. WT/DS138/R, 39-50 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter
LeadedBar case].
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Again, in such cases, the panel process can provide an effective discipline on
enforcement of domestic anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws.
The second area of continuing concern is the extraordinary challenge
procedure.'5 The extraordinary challenge has unfortunately provided a
vehicle for the worst kind of personalization of trade disputes. Shooting the
messenger rather than contesting the merits of a panel decision seems an
illogical approach to the resolution of the trade disputes. In particular, the
extraordinary challenge in the Softwood Lumber case represented the darkest
hour of the binational panel process. One of my strongest recommendations
is to eliminate the extraordinary challenge procedure or at least modify it so
it is available only in cases where the panel has exceeded its jurisdiction or
has seriously violated the standard of review.
Finally, certain FTA panel cases raised a concern (which continues today
under NAFTA Chapter 19) that panels occasionally reach decisions
inconsistent with the decisions of previous panels. I believe that forcing
panels to be consistent, with the consequent evolution of an independent,
panel-derived jurisprudence, would be contrary to the fundamental concept
of binational panels and, at least in the United States, would be the political
death knell of this system.
Changes in the 90s: NAFTA and the WTO

II.

The 1990s brought many changes in international trade law. There have
been three significant changes in the binational panel process under NAFTA
Chapter 19. First, grounds for extraordinary challenge have expanded to
include "failing" to apply the appropriate standard of review. 16 In my
opinion, this is a good provision for fighting a war that seems to be over.
Second, Annex 1901.2 now admonishes that the "roster [of panelists] shall
include judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable." In general,
this provision is a good idea, but it has not been effectively implemented to
date. Third, Article 1905 establishes a procedure to determine whether
application of a party's domestic law has prevented the establishment of a
panel, prevented the panel from rendering a final court decision, prevented
implementation of a panel decision, or frustrated review by a panel or court
of an administrative ant-dumping or countervailing duty determination. This
has potential utility with respect to the problems posed by applying the panel
system to the different judicial system of Mexico, as discussed in more detail
below.
15

NAFA, supra note 1, at annex 1904.13.

16 Id.
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In addition, the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
resulted in two important changes that have created a viable new method of
challenging U.S., Canadian and Mexican anti-dumping and countervailing
duty decisions. The substantive rules governing import relief proceedings
were elaborated somewhat as to anti-dumping cases and made much more
detailed and specific in the area of subsidies and countervailing duties. More
significant was the transformation of the GATT into the WTO with a new
and radically different Dispute Settlement Understanding. The DSU, with
time limits, procedural niceties and "non-blockable" decisions creates a truly
viable mechanism for challenging import relief case decisions and has begun
to be used with increasing frequency since its inception in 1994.
in.

NAFTA Chapter 19 Problems Peculiar to Appeals from Mexican
Decisions

Extension of the binational panel appeal process to Mexico introduced
numerous complexities, arising primarily from the following factors. First,
Mexico's anti-dumping law is new, and thus there is little in the way of
settled administrative practice. On the other hand, unlike the situation in the
U.S. and Canada, treaties - and thus the WTO Anti-dumping Agreement and
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures - are part of the
domestic law of Mexico. Consequently, a panel can invoke those agreements
as governing law to an extent not possible in appeals from U.S. and Canadian
decisions. In my view, reliance on WTO provisions may be increasing in the
United States.
In a recent reversal of a Commerce Department
countervailing duty determination, the court of appeals for the Federal
7
Circuit invoked a recent WTO panel decision in support of its conclusions.
Also, the U.s. brief to a recent WTO panel considering the 1916 Antidumping Act emphasized the judicial doctrine established in Murray v. The
Charming Betsy 18 that U.S. law should, to the extent possible, be construed
9
consistent with international (in that case, WTO) agreements.
Second, there has been no judicial precedent construing the Mexican
import relief laws. The Fiscal Tribunal, a Mexican administrative tax court,
had not reviewed any import relief decisions. Moreover, Mexico has a very
17

Delverde v. U.S., 202 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (referring to the WTO panel

decision in the Leaded Carcase in concluding that Commerce's countervailing determination
was not in accordance with the definition of a "subsidy" as stated in the Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Annex IA, Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Pt. I, Art. 1 (1994).
Is Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
19 Second Submission of the United States, United States - Anti-dumping
Act of 1916 in
response to the Complaint of the European Union, paras. 28-31 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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different concept of judicial precedent that do the U.S. and Canada. A
precedent is created only where five consecutive judicial decisions have
adopted the same interpretation, without any intervening contrary decision.20
Third, Mexico has a unique concept of the standard of review. For
example, Article 238 of Mexico's Federal Fiscal Code establishes a hierarchy
of five grounds (which must be considered in order) on which an
administrative determination may be overturned. These grounds are (I) lack
of jurisdiction or authority, (ii) omission of formal legal requirements, (iii)
procedural violation, (iv) erroneous analysis of the facts, or (v) a
discretionary determination outside the lawful scope of that discretion. 21
Fourth, in Mexico the possibility of a collateral attack on a panel decision
exists. At least in theory, a panel determination may be challenged under
Mexico's amparo procedure, in which an individual may raise constitutional
challenges to actions affecting her or his individual rights?2
Fifth, nullification of an agency decision is possible in Mexico. The first
case involving a Mexican decision found that, consistent with the powers of a
Mexican reviewing court, the panel has authority to nullify the agency
decision.23
In addition to these substantive complexities, there have been practical
problems that have arisen in panel consideration of appeals from Mexican
decisions. First, access to the administrative record has been difficult. In
early cases, parties seeking to review the record were confronted with a
demand for a large bond. This issue has now been resolved. Second, content
of the record has been an issue. On several occasions, there has been
controversy concerning documents that appeared in the record presented to
the panel, of which parties were previously unaware. Third, delay is a major
problem. There have been delays in appointing panelists, difficulties in
finding panelists without conflicts and several cases in which panelists
withdrew in mid-case because of newly arisen conflicts.
Despite the substantive complexities and practical problems - the
different legal system, the absence of precedent and the significant delay
problems - the panel system is working in Mexican cases. Indeed, success is
important at this stage because the Mexican panel process represents the only
vehicle used for review of Mexican import relief decisions.
For a more detailed discussion of the concept of precedent in Mexican law, see Robert E.
Lutz, Law, Procedureand Culture in Mexico Under the NAFTA: The Perspective of a NAFTA
Panelist,3 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 391,400-01 (1996).
21 Id. at 402-404.
20

22

Id. at 400.

In the Matter of Mexican Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of Cut-to-Length Plate
Products from the United States, MEX-94-1904-02 (Aug. 30, 1995).
23
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Conclusion - Does This Process Have a Future?

In light of the fact that there now exists another effective vehicle for
challenging anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions, the WTO's
DSU, one may question the continuing relevance of the Chapter 19 panel
process. A fair argument could be made for relying solely on the WTO for
the resolution of disputes concerning the enforcement of anti-dumping and
countervailing duty laws. Still, there are compelling reasons to maintain the
Chapter 19 panel process as an alternative.
To be sure, the WTO provides several distinct advantages over the
Chapter 19 panel process. The WTO process is significantly more
expeditious that binational panel appeals from Mexican decisions, where the
process is subject to serious delays. It is less costly for private litigants since
the government trade agency (USTR or its equivalent) bears much of the
burden. The WTO procedure also incorporates an Appellate Body, which
enhances the quality of decisions and provides a discipline on the occasional
aberrant panel. Most importantly, the WTO process is not limited to
ensuring compliance with domestic law, but instead imposes a true external
discipline.
Notwithstanding the foregoing WTO advantages, the chapter 19 panel
process provides a useful alternative to the WTO DSU. With relatively few
exceptions, the binational panels have reached well-reasoned decisions.
Unlike the WTO system, in which private parties must persuade their
governments to initiate dispute settlement, the Chapter 19 system gives
aggrieved private parties the power to bring their won challenges. Thus,
under Chapter 19, the aggrieved parties are not inhibited by external politics
or the government's own internal policies. A good example of this is the
Mexican High Fructose Corn Syrup case. There, a binational proceeding was
the only viable alternative to raise a "like-product" issue because the
International Trade Commission ("ITC") was wary of the U.S. government
taking that issue to the WTO for fear that a WTO decision would restrict the
ITC's flexibility in dealing with "like product" questions.
Most importantly, the Chapter 19 panel process serves a valuable
function with respect to Mexican import relief decisions, as to which it
represents the only viable means of ensuring compliance with domestic law
and procedures.
Although the Chapter 19 panel process remains viable, there are areas in
which improvement is needed. For example, the extraordinary challenge
process has not worked. The U.S. challenge in the Softwood Lumber case,
on thoroughly nasty conflict allegations, was the darkest hour in the history
of binational panels. Also, conflict of interest strictures should be made less
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strict not more strict. This would help ease the major cause of delays in
Mexican appeals. A back-up panelist would also be useful so that the entire
process would not be halted by the disqualification of one panelist.
Additionally, time limits on selection of panelists should be enforced,
perhaps by giving the other side the right o appoint the panelist where a
selection is not made in time. That said, and appellate body is not a good
idea. It would simply lead to relitigation of decided issues. Finally, the
argument that decisions should be made more consistent is in fact contrary to
the binational panel concept. The procedure is not intended to establish
precedents that bind domestic courts or administering authorities in future
cases.

In sum, my view is to keep the binational process with certain
modifications. However, for serious violations of trading norms the WTO
may provide the better forum for relief.

